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 Abstract: 
The paper provides an analysis of the militarization of scientific research and the scale and 
consequences of military and defence related research on university campuses in the United 
States and United Kingdom.  It achieves this through an analysis of the historical background 
to the complex forms of articulation which have developed between the military, industry and 
university research. Particular consideration is given to developments in the United States 
from 1940, including concerns expressed about the impact of an expanding military-industrial 
complex on the conduct of research in universities. Drawing on critical social and historical 
research the paper analyses the relationship between universities and colleges and the 
institution of the military in the United States and the United Kingdom, the symbiotic 
relationship between neoliberalism and militarism, and in addition, the consequences for the 
conduct of research in the natural sciences and the social sciences within universities.    
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 Introduction: the myth of a peaceful modernity  
The institution of the military has a prominent if not pivotal place within contemporary social 
life. Emboldened by the anticipated progressive effects of Enlightenment liberal thought on 
the organisation and conduct of human affairs, social analysts such as Henri Saint Simon 
(1760-1825) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857) expected scientific and technologically driven 
industrial innovation would substantially reduce, if not resolve, humanity’s problems and 
simultaneously quell the threat of militarism and war (Gane 2006). Contrary to such 
expectations the underlying reality of modern life has continued to be conflict, or anticipation 
and preparation for the same, and warfare has been a too-frequent and costly occurrence. The 
development of industrialism has not led to the expected marginalization of militarism; on the 
contrary, ‘[w]hat the main drift of the twentieth century … revealed is that ...  the economic 
and the military have become structurally and deeply interrelated, as the economy has 
become a seemingly permanent war economy; and military men and policies have 
increasingly penetrated the corporate economy’ (Wright Mills 2000: 215).   
The Enlightenment notion of a rational ordering of social and political life represented 
conflicts and wars as ‘relics of an era nearing its end, an era not yet illuminated by the 
Enlightenment’ (Joas and Knöbl 2013: 3). The subsequent historical period has demonstrated 
that any peace dividend, if such has existed, has been at best intermittent and has been 
overshadowed by a growing industrialization of war.  Scientific and technological research 
has made possible the manufacture of ever-more complex and powerful modern weaponry 
with massive destructive potential and has thereby further increased the risk of large-scale 
warfare and nuclear conflict (Giddens 1991: 74 and 172-3). The assumption that ‘modernity 
is peaceful’ and that we have become less violent, as Pinker (2011) argues, is contradicted 
not only by the persistent presence of wars, violence, and conflicts, but also by the ‘cultural 
importance of war’ and the continuing, if not increasing, significance of the institution of the 
military within modern life (Joas 1999: 459: 468). 
 
The military-industrial complex: history and political economy 
How did it come to this? How has it happened that so many social, economic, and cultural 
resources are devoted to global military provision and deployment?  Let us begin with a data 
snapshot of where things stand in respect of the major players in global military expenditure.  
In 2013, global military spending was reported to be $1747 billion; in the United States, after 
a $44 billion drop in its military expenditure following reductions in overseas operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, military spending stood at $640 billion (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 
2014: 1). Notwithstanding a reduction of 7.8% in military expenditure in the course of 2013, 
the United States was still spending roughly equivalent to China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, India, and South Korea combined (Perlo-
Freeman and Solmirano 2014: 2, Figure 1).  Moreover, in 2015 President Barack Obama 
presented his fiscal 2016 budget proposal to Congress, which included a planned 4.5% 
increase in US military spending. (1) 
    
The data provided on military expenditure in the United States generally relates to the 
Department of Defense and does not include significant levels of expenditure on a range of 
other military and defence-related matters that come out of the budgets of other departments 
– for example, nuclear weapons production, maintenance and research (Department of 
Energy), security and protection (Department of Homeland Security), counter-terrorism 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation), and reconnaissance satellites and intelligence gathering, as 
well as research to improve performance of military airplanes (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration). Accurate estimates of the actual levels of US military spending are 
hard to achieve, but a complex budget-based approach employed by Cypher (2007) 
calculated that in 2006 military-related expenditure was already in the region of $929.8 
billion and a comparable calculation for 2007 indicated an even higher figure of $1002.5 
billion (Foster et al 2008).   According to governmental accounts the size of US military 
expenditure is the second highest budgetary item after Social Security but, as Hossein-zadeh 
(2009) argues, insofar as Social Security is a ‘self-financing trust fund’, then the largest 
source of US government expenditure is on military and defence.   
From 1940, and the onset of a dramatic increase in US military expenditure required to create 
the military capacity necessary to prepare the country for participation in the Second World 
War, substantial military spending has been a significant feature of the US economy. It is in 
this period that the US military budget began to increase significantly and business began to 
engage in military production on a growing scale, causing concern to be expressed at the time 
about ‘the rising power of big business and the armed forces’ (Parker 2005: 163).  The 
configuration of powerful military and industrial interests growing in strength in the United 
States from the 1940s provoked serious concerns about the influence that might be exerted 
over the post-war policies of democratic governments, concerns which were articulated by 
academic analysts and, most tellingly, by a President of the United States as he was about to 
leave office (Galbraith 2005; Mills 1967 [1958]; Eisenhower 1961).   
 
Military-industrial complexities 
Deployment of the term ‘military-industrial complex’, to describe the configuration of 
interests that brought business corporations and the military into an increasingly close 
relationship, gained traction following the public farewell address delivered by Dwight 
Eisenhower, the 34th President of the United States, on January 17th 1961. In a wide-ranging 
speech, Eisenhower made reference to the United States’ ‘unmatched material ... riches and 
military strength’, to the country’s ‘free government’ and to the importance of protecting and 
fostering liberty (1961: 1036). Yet, the speech is perhaps best remembered for its 
identification of potential threats and one in particular that Eisenhower believed arose from 
the growing influence exerted by the military institution and a growing armaments industry.  
Eisenhower (1961: 1038) noted how rapidly the US military had grown and that global 
conflicts had compelled the nation ‘to create a permanent armaments industry of vast 
 proportions’ and, in addition, to create a large defence establishment. Recognizing that the 
scale of the expenditure on military security exceeded the net income of all US corporations 
at the time, Eisenhower (1961: 1038) commented that the conjunction of interest and 
influence of ‘an immense military establishment and a large arms industry’ was a new and 
necessary development, yet there were significant and troubling implications for society. 
Eisenhower cautioned:  
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of 
misplaced power exists and will persist (1961: 1038).  
Eisenhower had in mind the potential threat to liberty and to the representative democratic 
political system, implying that oversight and regulation of ‘the huge industrial and military 
machinery of defense’ would be necessary (1961: 1038).  
Taking stock of the period from the onset of the Second World War, and in particular the 
changes in military and industrial technologies and associated developments deriving from 
complex and costly scientific  research, Eisenhower observed that a ‘steadily increasing share 
is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government’ (1961: 1038). A 
substantial share of the Federal government funding of scientific and technological research 
went to university institutions.  The implications for universities were considerable, as 
Eisenhower recognized:  
[T]he free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has 
experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a 
government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard 
there are now hundreds of new electronic computers (1961: 1038).  
The risk, as Eisenhower (1961: 1039) saw it, was that the scale of Federal funding and the 
heavy emphasis placed on associated governmental project priorities would exercise an 
inappropriate, if not dominating, influence and be detrimental to ‘the nation’s scholars’, 
shaping their research interests, what they chose to research and how they proceeded to do so. 
With the benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower’s concerns seem more than justified. In the 
subsequent six decades, Federal government expenditure on military matters has grown 
significantly, along with the influence of industrial corporations involved in the production of 
armaments, equipment, resources, and a range of services for military use and military 
personnel.  During this period the United States has ‘spent more on its military-industrial 
complex than all of the other countries in the world combined have spent on defence’ 
(Naughton 2014).  An additional significant feature of the period has been a relative shift of 
emphasis from kinetic weaponry to ‘“smart” miniaturised weaponry ... and information 
warfare’ and the growing significance of the latter, exemplified by increasing US National 
Security Agency (NSA) and UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) global 
data capture, has led reference to be made to ‘the evolution of a military-information 
complex’ (Naughton 2014).  In turn, there has been a significant increase in the levels of 
Federal funding provided to universities for directly and indirectly military-related forms of 
scientific and technological research, including in the social sciences (Long 1986; Ghoshroy 
2011; Price 2011; Department of Defense 2014a: 2014b).  
 While the notion of a ‘military-industrial complex’ is associated with Eisenhower, the term 
had already been employed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by Winfield 
Riefler (1947); the configuration of interests signified by the term had been identified in 
critical analyses of elites in the United States in the work of sociologist C Wright Mills in the 
late 1950s (2000 [1956]; 1967 [1958]). (2)  Moreover, embryonic signs of the essential 
dynamics of a military-industrial complex have been traced further back to the decades 
before the First World War, when struggles for geopolitical hegemony led to closer 
relationships beginning to be forged between governments and armaments industry in 
research and development designed to deliver advanced weapon technologies (Cooling 1979; 
Epstein 2014). In studies of increasing collaboration between government, armaments 
industry, and the military in the late nineteenth century, Cooling (1979: 108-9) identifies ‘the 
blueprint for ... [and] first tentacles of a modern military-industrial complex’, and Epstein 
(2014: 2) argues that ‘a new paradigm for procuring weapons brought the military-industrial 
complex into existence’.  The increasing complexity and expense involved in developing 
industrial naval technology, specifically ‘armor and armament of the new steel navy’ in 
Cooling’s (1979: 9) study and  torpedoes in Epstein’s study, meant that established materials 
and methods of shipbuilding, and traditional methods of weapons construction, had to 
change. In consequence collaboration on research and development between governments 
and private industry became necessary.  
Epstein (2014: 2) reports that such collaboration made subsequent ownership of intellectual 
property rights difficult to determine and led to legal disputes with private industry in both 
the United States and Great Britain: 
In the name of national security the American and British governments pursued their intellectual 
property rights claims ... Exploring them provides a valuable new perspective on the creeping 
militarization of peace in two liberal democracies.    
It was the sophisticated and, at the turn of the century, cutting-edge weapon technology of the 
torpedo that transformed the relationship between government, military, and the armaments 
industry. Governments sought to introduce national security measures to protect and control 
developments in weapon technology and weapon systems in respect of which they had 
collaborated and provided funds, in order to prevent private corporations selling such 
weapons on the open global armaments market. Torpedoes were complexly engineered 
weapon systems and they contributed significantly to ‘the origins of the military-industrial 
complex’ (Epstein 2014: 3). Although significantly smaller in scale, key elements of the 
military-industrial complex had been assembling from the end of the nineteenth century, 
notably, 
replacement of the market by command, public-sector investment in private-sector technological 
development, the role of technocratic elites in the policy process, the beginnings of big science, and 
government outreach to academia (Epstein 2014: 229). 
In the twentieth century, the elements identified above grew in scale and scope. The need for 
industrial mobilization to ensure adequate provision for the armed services in the course of 
the First World War led to the formation of the Council for National Defense and its National 
Defense Advisory Commission. This development  has been identified as particularly 
 influential in laying ‘the foundation for that closely knit structure, industrial, civil and 
military’, which subsequently became more extensive, complex, and influential within the 
United States (Koistinen 1967: 379 and 385; see also Wright Mills 2000 [1956]; 1967 
[1958]). 
 
Power elite and Pentagon system 
In a critical analysis conducted in the late 1950s in the United States, Wright Mills (2000: 5) 
noted the inter-connectedness between the major institutional hierarchies – the political-
military-economic establishments – their access to powerful technologies and the significant 
consequences of their activities:  
The decisions of a handful of corporations bear upon military and political as well as economic 
developments around the world.  The decisions of the military establishment rest upon and grievously 
affect political life as well as the very level of economic activity. The decisions made within the 
political domain determine economic activities and military programs. There is no longer, on the one 
hand, an economy, and on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment 
unimportant to politics and money-making. There is a political economy linked, in a thousand ways, 
with military institutions and decisions (2000: 7-8, emphasis added).  
The economic relevance of the military establishment was evident in peacetime early in the twentieth 
century with the engagement of the Corps of Engineers in the construction and maintenance of 
harbours and the control of rivers. Yet, while the military exerted a social and economic influence 
early in the century, it was only for a relatively brief period, primarily during the First World War, 
and it was not till the Second World War that a close and continuous interconnection was established 
between military and industrial corporations (Wright Mills 2000: 7-8; see also Koistinen 1967). 
On retirement from the services, following the Second World War, significant numbers of 
military personnel moved to become members of corporate boards and a range of lucrative 
contracts were made by the military with industrial corporations. Taking stock of the respects 
in which military demands influenced the corporate economy, Wright Mills concludes that 
‘[b]ack of this shift at the top, and behind the increased military budget on which it rests, 
there lies the great structural shift of modern Anglo-American capitalism toward a permanent 
war economy’ (2000: 215). Military expenditure, in contrast to social expenditure, has 
constituted capital’s preferential form of state expenditure. This has been particularly evident 
in the United States where ‘military Keynesianism’ rather than social spending has been the 
default economic policy of successive US governments as they have sought to regulate the 
business cycle by expanding ‘military allocations to ensure an adequate level of aggregate 
demand for commodities’ (Custers 2010: 80).  In short, as well as meeting the requirements 
for military preparedness, dedicating substantial state expenditure to the military institution, 
or ‘deficit-financing of its militarism’, has represented a politically popular means of 
combating economic stagnation, of stimulating aggregate demand in the economy, in a 
manner that compliments and supports, rather than competes with, private capital (Harvey 
2005: 152; Custers 2010; Galbraith 1969a; Baran and Sweezy 1970; Mandel 1978).  
Intervention by the state to maintain the economy is a longstanding feature of modern 
capitalism, whether monopoly, late, or neoliberal in form. Chomsky (1993) credits 
 ‘international military Keynesianism’ with having reconstructed ‘state capitalist industrial 
societies’ and as having provided ‘the basis for the huge expansion of Transnational 
Corporations’.  Yet, while acknowledging the significance of state military expenditure, or 
the ‘Pentagon system’, especially for the way in which it has served as a vehicle for publicly 
underwriting the research and development costs of innovations in materials, products, and 
technologies, of which private corporations are the subsequent beneficiaries, Chomsky (2004) 
contests the value of a specific conception of a military-industrial complex, arguing that 
‘government money’ or ‘the state sector’ is perpetually at the core of the economy.    
Chomsky (2004) emphasises the continuing significant and wide-ranging role played by the 
modern state in the economy. Notwithstanding the neoliberal contraction of the state from the 
1970s, including reductions in social and welfare provision, dedicated military expenditure 
by the state has remained substantial (Chomsky 2004; Harvey 2005). In the course of making 
a series of references to the many respects in which government expenditure has been 
deployed to fund research and underwrite development costs, in many instances to the benefit 
of private corporate interests or ‘private pockets’, Chomsky (2004) notes how leading 
academic institutions, including Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard, 
have received substantial research funds from various government departments.  For 
example, the Department of Defense, through the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) established in 1958, funded research on computer communications networks in 
research laboratories and universities, including the University of California, Berkeley, and 
MIT, from which in due course the Internet and a constellation of global information 
technology corporations developed. (3) 
 
The military, research, and the institution of the university 
The experience of working on the US Strategic Bombing Survey in the mid-1940s led J K 
Galbraith to become concerned about the influence the military-industrial complex might 
exert in peacetime over democratic governments. Galbraith (1969b) was concerned about the 
overlapping interests and synergies between the military bureaucracy and industrial corporate 
military contractors   He was particularly alarmed about the respects in which scientific 
research was being ‘reshaped to serve institutional and doctrinal goals’ (Parker 2005: 190).  
Following the Second World War the military had become the principal supporter and 
director of scientific research in the United States. As Wright Mills (2000 [1956]: 216) 
observed, ‘the general direction of pure scientific research has been set by military 
considerations, its major finances are from military funds, and very few of those engaged in 
basic scientific research are not working under military direction’. 
A relationship between US universities and colleges and the institution of the military has 
been traced back to the 1862 Morrill Land-College Act, which provided resources to allow 
states to establish institutions promoting ‘agriculture and the mechanical arts’, with the 
proviso that military training and instruction was part of the curriculum (Abrams 1989: 16). 
However it was only with the approach of the conflict that began in Europe in 1939 that the 
 US military began to fund substantial scientific and technological research projects in major 
universities and colleges (DeLauer 1989).  The largest government contracts for military 
research and development of more than $10 million went to each of the following six 
institutions: ‘the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of 
Technology, Harvard University, Columbia University, the University of California at 
Berkeley and Johns Hopkins University’ (Turse 2004).  In the years following the war, many 
of the formative institutional networks and collaborative relationships between the military, 
universities, and the armaments industry were consolidated.  By August 1946, when the 
Office of Naval Research received formal legislative authorisation to commence work, it had 
already successfully ‘entered into contracts for 602 academic projects employing over 4000 
scientists and graduate students’ (Turse 2004). The fact that, following the Serviceman’s 
Readjustment Act passed in 1944 (the GI Bill), many returning war veterans became students 
and went on to study science, engineering and other technical subjects, and that many faculty 
members also had ‘direct knowledge and experience of military organizations’, goes some 
way towards explaining the readiness with which the academic community embraced 
military-university cooperation in respect of research and development in the immediate post-
war period through to the Vietnam conflict (DeLauer 1989: 132; Docherty 2015: 3).  
In the post-war period the United States became a mobilized polity, within which scientific 
research and development became increasingly closely articulated with military and defence 
priorities and associated requirements (Bell 1973). Examples include ‘two major research 
laboratories ... operated under contract by the University of California for the Atomic Energy 
Commission’ (now the Department of Energy) both of which, in addition to supporting the 
development of nuclear weapons, have been involved in research on a range of other major 
military projects (DeLauer 1989: 132). Two additional research laboratories at Cal Tech and 
MIT respectively also became part of the military-university infrastructure. In 1947 the 
RAND Corporation, the first of the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
(FFRDCs), was established and although not formally connected with particular universities 
these centres developed ‘advisory or steering-committee relationships’ with a number of 
universities (DeLauer 1989: 132; Hruby et al 2011).  Furthermore, university staff had close 
relationships with the Department of Defense (DoD) as members of scientific and technical 
advisory bodies and a significant number of university campus-based DoD funded research 
projects and programmes were set up, initiated from the late 1950s, by the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which from 1972 became the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). (4) 
As a consequence of these developments and other related initiatives, the US government was 
spending twenty times as much on research and development by 1954 as it had before the 
Second World War, and the majority of it was on military and national security, leading 
‘pure’ science research in some of the bigger universities to be increasingly dependent upon 
military funding. The increasing ‘militarization of science’ meant that some US universities 
virtually had become ‘financial branches of the military establishment’, receiving three or 
four times as much money from military as from all other sources combined (Wright Mills 
2000: 217-218; see also Harvey 2005: 83). 
 The close relationship between the military and universities led to tensions, particularly 
around the need to preserve academic freedom from the intrusion of the state. There were 
also associated concerns about DoD rejection of peer review of funded military research 
initiatives and adoption of ‘merit review, which, to curry favour with a broader congressional 
constituency, included such criteria as a balanced geographic and institutional distribution of 
awards’ (Abrams 1989: 28). While opposition had been expressed to ‘university sponsorship 
of classified or secret research’, led by the President of Harvard University, other institutions, 
including MIT, took a different view and permitted classified research and classified 
doctorates to continue, appealing to rising national security concerns following the onset of 
the Cold War (Abrams 1989: 21).  Military funding provided vital support for MIT and 
enabled it to maintain its national reputation at the forefront of research in engineering and 
science, and it remains the university ‘whose research agenda is most closely aligned to the 
needs of the military’ (Kirp 2003: 177).  The overriding view in the 1950s and 1960s was that 
the level of federal funding for military contract research in universities ‘played a major role 
in the explosion of knowledge in the United States and in the rise to pre-eminence of [Anglo-
]American scientific disciplines in the world community’ (Trow 1975: 113).   
In the course of the Vietnam War, student protests and heated faculty discussions on 
professional ethics began to take place on university campuses in the United States over 
military funding of university research or ‘war research’ (Wilson 1989: 47).  Universities 
with federal funding for military-related research were heavily criticized for being ‘complicit’ 
in the Vietnam War; and students, especially Students for a Democratic Society, targeted the 
‘military-industrial-intellectual complex’ and expressed the view that universities should not 
be entangled with the DoD and the security state. University scientific research related to the 
military was criticised for its vulnerability to corruption because of the demand for secrecy, 
the prioritisation of applied work and product development over pure research, and, most of 
all, ‘the subordination of academic work to military need rather than scientific purpose’ 
(Wilson 1989: 48). The opposition of faculty and students to the Vietnam War and the close 
links between universities and the DoD caused some institutions to sever their connections 
with FFRDCs’ (Abrams 1989: 27).   
Following the end of the Vietnam War a combination of factors led to the military-industrial 
funding regime for academic research being called into question.  Increasing global economic 
competitiveness, deteriorating US productivity in comparison to Europe and Japan, and signs 
of a developing information economy led ‘US industrial leaders, long accustomed to R&D 
filtered through the military ... to have second thoughts’ about past research funding practices 
centred on ‘the military-industrial-academic model’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2010: 48) and to 
advocate research and development orientated more directly to civilian standards and 
entrepreneurial interests. In the period from 1975-1985 defence industries were restructured, 
‘defense prime contractors declined from fifteen to five’, and Congress began to actively 
nurture civilian technology research and development and promote ‘university-industry-
government partnerships’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2010: 48).  But developments from the 
1980s, in particular what has been described as ‘the largest military build-up in the post-
World War II era’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2010: 47), have meant the militarization of US 
 universities has remained a highly contentious matter and it continues to be regarded as a 
threat to academic freedom and integrity (O’Dowd 2014: McCoy 2014; Bond-Graham 2013; 
Giroux 2007; Turse 2004; Hell and Bond-Graham 2003). (5)  
 
Arming the academy, harming the institution of the university 
In the 1980s Republican President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) presided over a significant 
increase in military expenditure. Regan initiated a ‘deficit-funded arms race (“military-
Keynesianism”)’ (Harvey 2005: 88). Developments in technology seemed to promise 
innovative and powerful new weapon systems and the US DoD increased its funding of 
university research, including on work in areas specifically relevant to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) set up by President Reagan in 1984 to pursue a technologically driven 
defensive strategy to combat attack by nuclear missiles (Kistiakowsky 1989; Wilson 1989). 
While the Association of American Universities (AAU) and university presidents welcomed 
increased research funding by the DoD, Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ initiative was greeted with a 
good deal of scepticism and criticism from researchers who disputed the technical feasibility 
of the anti-ballistic missile system and questioned its strategic effects, costs, and geo-political 
consequences (Kistiakowsky 1989: 144; Wilson 1989: 46; Long 1986: 48). There was also 
increasing concern about the priority accorded to military-related R&D to the detriment of 
other research programs and the lack of resources directed to the pursuit of alternatives to the  
militarization of security, for example ‘arms control and international negotiation’ (Long 
1986: 48).  
The rapid increases in defence spending, particularly on research and development following 
SDI, meant a substantial additional source of research funds was available for university 
scientists. Yet, there were serious concerns on university campuses arising from the way in 
which those administering the programme had approached universities. The accusation was 
made that it ‘smacks of a mixture of bribery and coercion’; in addition, there were fears that 
some well-regarded scientists preoccupied with a careerist pursuit of research funding had 
sacrificed academic integrity and ‘knowingly exaggerated the feasibility’ of SDI, leading 
critical academics to boycott SDI funded research projects (Kaysen 1989: 38; Abrams 1989: 
28; Wilson 1989: 46).   
The imposition of neoliberal policies on higher education in the United States has led to 
reduced levels of funding and rising student debt, the imposition of market mechanisms on 
universities, the erosion or undermining of faculty self-governance, and ‘the intrusion of the 
national security state’ (Giroux 2014: 138).  Comparable consequences are an increasing 
feature of higher education in the United Kingdom, where neoliberal policies have led to 
students paying fees, taking out loans, and incurring debt as they study; the introduction of 
bureaucratic auditing of research, teaching, and staff; governmental demands that university 
institutions provide training and skills, to enhance the employability prospects of students; 
and, in addition, that universities operate as part of the nation state’s security surveillance 
 apparatus by keeping check of the whereabouts of foreign students for the UK Border 
Agency (Grayson 2012).  
The essential critical public contribution of higher education to a thriving democratic culture 
and polity in the United States and the United Kingdom is being undermined in multiple 
respects by anti-democratic financial and political forces and pressures deriving from 
militarism and neoliberalism (Giroux 2007: 2008). Reductions in public funding and 
provision for higher education in the course of the neoliberal retrenchment of the public 
sector, which has included selling off state assets, outsourcing public services, and the 
promotion of privatization, has shifted a significant share of the costs of university education 
on to students, now designated as consumers in the marketplace for commodified knowledge 
products, training, and skills in pursuit of employability status in an increasingly digitalized, 
informational, machine-centric capitalism, which is displacing human expertise and 
employment with intelligent machines (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Frey and Osborne 
2013). (6) 
Higher education has been recast as the institutional nexus for (i) producing highly qualified 
labour power ready for inclusion in corporate enterprises integral to a digitalized, 
informational, neoliberal capitalist economy and (ii) generating ‘marketable’ research to meet 
the requirements and satisfy the vested interests of funding agencies, end-users, and 
corporations preoccupied with ‘impact’ within the unquestioned parameters and established 
practices of the prevailing systemic organization of social and economic life.  With higher 
education no longer publicly funded through taxation to the extent that it once was, a 
significant proportion of the costs are now ‘privatized’, off loaded on to students who on 
completion of their studies shoulder an unsustainable burden of debt.  In the neoliberal 
ordering of higher education in the United States, college and university student debt in 2013 
was approaching on average $28,400 on graduation and in the United Kingdom it was 
estimated that ‘the average loan issued per student over the life of their course is £40,286’ 
(The Institute for College Access and Success 2014: 1; Crawford et al 2014: 23: 51).  
But while a reduction in the public sector is a fundamental feature of neoliberalism, the state 
continues to resource and defend ‘the institutions of business ownership and [sustain if not 
enhance] the ability to project military power’ (Cypher 2007).  There is a symbiotic 
relationship between neoliberalism and militarism in the United States, both embody 
particular worldviews, draw on educational institutions and practices, and disseminate 
discursive formations to legitimate the governmental techniques, modes of subjectivity, and 
(sub)versions of citizenship and rationality they contrive to establish as hegemonic (Giroux 
2008: 58). Forms of neoliberal subjectivity, the constitution of individuals as ‘subjects of 
“human capital”’ (Read 2009: 25), have long been constituted within the system of higher 
education in the United States and the military has had a growing presence and rising profile 
on university campuses from at least the mid-nineteenth century, but it is only with the 
increasing securitization of the state following the events of 9/11 that ‘the university has ... 
become an intense site of militarization’ (Giroux 2008: 58).  
 The military has an established presence in US higher education and on university campuses 
in the United States and around the world (Turse 2004).   There are approaching 150 
specifically military designated educational institutions in the United States, including the 
following: 
the National Defense University system (NDU): the National War College, the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, the School for National Security Executive Education, the Joint Forces Staff College, 
and the Information Resources Management College ... the Defense Acquisition University, the Joint 
Military Intelligence College ... the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, Air University, the Air Force Institute of Technology, the 
Marine Corps University and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (Turse 2004). 
Then there are the numerous public and private higher education institutions in receipt of 
DoD research funding, offering courses suitable for military personnel and tailoring 
programmes of study designed for students seeking employment in the various ‘departments 
and agencies associated with the warfare state’ (Giroux 207: 19). The latter, the civilian 
higher education institutions, which have become increasingly militarized, far outweigh the 
DoD institutions and service academies in ‘size, scope and cost’ (Turse 2004). In their report 
on DoD research the AAU state that such forms of investment in basic research in 
universities have produced a range of innovations including lasers, infrared technologies, and 
various composite materials. The AAU notes how dependent the DoD is on universities and 
colleges to conduct research, with more than 350 institutions involved in some capacity, and 
how significant DoD funding is in some fields. For example, 
DoD is the leading federal sponsor of university engineering research. DoD provides: 90% of all 
federal obligations for mechanical engineering; 64% for electrical engineering; 71% for aeronautical 
engineering; 46% for astronautical engineering; and 38% for metallurgy and material engineering 
(Association of American Universities 2013). 
Given the scale of military funding in higher education, which in addition to engineering is 
significant in a number of other fields, including computer sciences, oceanography, and 
following the Minerva Initiative, the social sciences, it follows that the DoD can ‘bend 
universities ever more easily to its will’ and exert influence to determine ‘the sorts of 
research that get undertaken and the sorts that don't’ (Turse 2004). 
The Minerva Initiative was launched in 2008 to fund social science research on a range of 
key strategic themes and issues and in 2014 the range of projects being funded included 
research on ‘civil conflict under different climate change scenarios’, ‘the origin, 
characteristics and implications of mass movements’, ‘assessment of social disequilibrium 
and security threats’, ‘energy and environmental drivers of stress and conflict’, and 
‘assessment of state stability’ (Department of Defense 2014b). (7) The projects funded, which 
bring together ‘universities, research institutions and individual scholars’, are on ‘specific 
topic areas determined by the Secretary of Defense’ (Department of Defense 2015, emphasis 
added). The programme of research is designed to provide officials and policy-makers with 
understanding of the complex and varied forces which might bear on local/internal and global 
US strategic interests. In 2014 a Guardian reporter investigating the latest round of funding 
associated with the Initiative sought clarification from the US DoD as to why they were 
commissioning projects on political protest movements and social activism around the world, 
 specifically what was the connection between radical causes promoted by NGOs and US 
national security.  The response from Minerva's Programme Director was as follows:  
Department of Defense takes seriously its role in the security of the United States, its citizens, and US 
allies and partners. While every security challenge does not cause conflict, and every conflict does not 
involve the US military, Minerva helps fund basic social science research that helps increase the 
Department of Defense's understanding of what causes instability and insecurity around the world. By 
better understanding these conflicts and their causes beforehand, the Department of Defense can better 
prepare for the dynamic future security environment (cited in Ahmed 2014). 
 
One project led by Cornell University, but supervised by the US Air Office of Scientific 
Research, had as its focus ‘the dynamics of social movement mobilization and contagions’ 
and sought to derive an understanding of the ‘critical mass (tipping point) of social 
contagions’ through analysis of ‘digital traces’, including Twitter posts and conversations, on 
the revolutionary events in Egypt (2011), the fuel subsidy crisis in Nigeria (2012), and ‘the 
2013 Gazi park protests in Turkey’ (Ahmed 2014). 
 
Ahmed (2014) describes how social science is being ‘militarized to develop “operational 
tools” to target peaceful activists and protest movements’. In a comparable manner, Price 
(2011) offers a critical analysis of the militarisation and securitisation of anthropology in the 
United States, in particular the influence the CIA has within university campuses and the 
ways in which anthropology has been appropriated for counterinsurgency purposes and 
deployed in current wars and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. (8)  In short, Price (2011: 5) 
provides further evidence of the ways in which the political economy of US higher education 
is increasingly articulated with ‘the dominant militarized economy that supports American 
society’.  The increasing intrusion of military and intelligence agencies into US university 
campuses leads Price (2011: 53: 55) to argue that academic values and practices and the 
integrity of academic disciplines are under threat as ‘academics have become compliant 
appendages of the state’.   
 
The forms of articulation between US military agencies and US universities are now complex 
and varied. The DoD not only offers significant research funding to US universities and 
colleges but, in turn, through agencies such as the National Security Agency, establishes 
specialized schools and centres on other campuses which are then able to compete for 
funding.  In 2003-2004 in the region of  ‘36 civilian schools and 4 military learning centers’ 
were designated Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, 
including ‘Stanford University ... the University of California at Davis and the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha, and lesser-known institutions like New Mexico Tech, West Virginia's 
James Madison University and Vermont's Norwich University’ (Turse 2004).  
 
UK universities, military funding, and collaboration 
It is not only US universities that have received US military research funding. University 
institutions in Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and several other countries have also 
been awarded funding by the US DoD (Department of Defense 2014a; Naumann 2013; 
Schwager and Rahn 2014).  Towards the end of 2006, it was estimated that the DoD had 
 military-related research contracts with 946 universities and colleges in the United States and 
with 161 universities in 33 other countries around the world (Bogart 2007).  In the United 
Kingdom in the period from 1979-2015, while neoliberal economic policies of successive 
administrations led to relative reductions in direct government funding of higher education, 
funding for research from military sources and weapons establishments increased (Beale et al 
2007; Parkinson 2012; Smith 2012; Langley 2013).   
Reflecting on the transformations in the United States following 9/11, Giroux (2008: 60) 
comments that ‘militarization ... has become naturalized, serving as a powerful pedagogical 
force that shapes our lives, memories and daily experiences, while erasing everything critical 
and emancipatory about history, justice, solidarity and the meaning of democracy’.  
Something comparable has occurred in the United Kingdom as military matters have been 
‘repositioned at the centre of national life’ and military-related research funding from 
government and the armaments industry has become more prominent within higher education 
institutions (Ware 2012; Langley et al 2007; Langley 2005).   
In the period 2001-2006, a study of 26 UK universities found that there were 1,900 military 
research projects with an estimated total value of £725 million and, furthermore, ‘that the 
military has, in particular, built up strong levels of influence over science, engineering and 
technology departments’ (Beale et al 2007: 4-5).  In circumstances under which universities 
have been exposed to relative reductions in funding, directly or indirectly publicly financed 
military research has proven to be appealing to both institutions and academic researchers, 
especially where, within institutions, managerially induced pressure to pursue external 
sources of research funding has made ‘“research-grant capture” … often more important than 
the actual research being done’ (Docherty 2015: 24).  The current conditions in higher 
education, particularly in relation to research, make the prospect of research funding from the 
institution of the military and/or the defence industry very appealing, but not without 
significant consequences for institutions and academic research staff involved.  As one 
professor of engineering critically commented on the impact of the research audits (RAE 
1986-2008; REF 2014-date) to which universities and research staff have been subjected in 
the course of cycles of rationing of scarce research resources: 
The UK university RAE is all powerful and encourages all academics to go for any funding no matter 
where it comes from (the ‘feeding frenzy’). If you turn down research funding, then you are 
automatically weakening your department’s prospective RAE performance and letting down your 
colleagues. The RAE definitely undermines research ethics in this respect (cited in Beale et al 2007:8, 
emphasis added). 
 
The Ministry of Defence and corporations such as BAE Systems have a variety of military-
related research contracts available for compliant universities to pursue, in competition with 
other institutions in the sector, frequently in conjunction with appropriate research councils in 
engineering and the physical sciences.  Military research funded projects ‘often confer 
prestige on the researcher and the institution as a whole’ and provide the means for 
universities and academic researchers to strive to maintain, if not enhance, their position in 
the proliferating rankings of research intensive universities, but, in turn ‘the logic of 
productivity and competition’ and perpetual pressure to monetize research and think and act 
 entrepreneurially to increase the prospect of securing new research grant revenue streams, has 
significantly detrimental consequences for research ethics (Beale et al 2007: 38-9; Inglis 
2014).  
In the period 2008-2011, leading universities in the United Kingdom received £23.6 million 
‘[d]irect UK government military funding’ and £62.8 million, ostensibly from private 
corporations (e.g. Rolls Royce £36.8 million; BAE Systems £10.6 million; QinetiQ £3.25 
million), but most of the corporate funding was at source ‘ultimately government funding, 
through research and development (R&D) contracts from the Ministry of Defence and other 
government agencies’ (Smith 2012).  The universities receiving the highest military-related 
research funds were Imperial College (£15.2 million), Sheffield (£13.8 million), (Cambridge 
£13.8 million), Oxford (£9+million), Bristol (£6.5 million), Nottingham (just under £6 
million), Kings College (£5.3 million), York (£3.9 million), Southampton (£3.8 million) and 
Newcastle (£2 million) (Smith 2012).   
A significant additional source of military-related university research funding has been from 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), specifically ‘through its Technical Outreach 
programme of scientific research and collaboration’, which has increasingly close 
connections with scientific, engineering, and technology researchers in UK universities 
(Langley 2013: 5).  AWE is owned by AWE plc, which is a consortium of Jacobs 
Engineering Group, Lockheed Martin UK, and Serco. AWE sites are owned by the UK 
government which also has a golden share in AWE plc. Five universities, Bristol, Cambridge, 
Cranfield, Heriott-Watt, and Imperial College, are designated ‘strategic partners’ with AWE 
and are involved in wider research programmes and receive long-term funding, but another 
45 universities, many of which have had separate sources of funding from the Department of 
Defence and other parts of the military sector, have also received funding from AWE since 
2010 (Langley 2013: 16: 39). (9) While AWE research may have potential value for peaceful 
purposes as well as military use in respect of the development of weapons of mass 
destruction, there are ethical and logistical concerns about the risks to which academic 
researchers are exposing themselves in accepting funding to conduct research on highly 
sensitive and controversial matters (Nuclear Information Service 2014). The funding of UK 
university research from the DoD through AWE has been described as ‘widespread’ (Langley 
2013: 34). In the region of half of all UK university institutions are ‘engaged in activities 
with research potentially linked to nuclear weapons’ and this has raised concerns about the 
influence exerted over research ethos, accountability, and ethics, and fears that staff with 
heavy military-based research portfolios will not have sufficient time to conduct research 
‘more clearly in the public good’ (Langley 2013: 34: 39-40). 
The research agenda in UK universities increasingly is driven by the influence of commercial 
interests and the military sector. The commercialization of universities in the United 
Kingdom, deriving from neoliberal economic policies of successive political administrations 
from the 1970s, has decreased ‘funding for “blue-skies” research’ and led to the fostering of 
initiatives with government and commercial wings of the military sector contributing 
significantly to changes in both ‘the role and the identity of universities’ (Langley 2013: 64; 
see also Motluk 1996). Research in UK universities is now subject to the increasing influence 
 of economic expectations, ‘commercial end-points’, and corporate interests, as well as the 
growing involvement of the military sector, but the significance of the latter is not confined to 
the United Kingdom, as Langley (2013: 66) notes: 
The voice of the military sector (government and commercial) is frequently heard in setting research 
and teaching priorities in the UK, USA and in other countries of the European Union, often above those 
with a different view.  As well as hoping to frame the security agenda at the national level, this voice 
colours research, training and teaching programmes across departments in many UK universities. 
The Research Impact agenda, integral to the Research Excellence Framework (REF) auditing 
exercise to which UK universities are periodically subjected, is another less obvious 
manifestation of the growing influence of military and commercial-industrial interests over 
higher education and university research. In 2009 the newly established UK Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) expressed the view that, given the excellence of 
research in UK universities, consideration needed to be given to ‘the ways in which research 
can make greater social and economic impact’ (2009: 3).  BIS demanded that universities 
‘contribute to economic growth, both through the knowledge they generate and through 
preparing our people for the world of modern work’ (2009: 12) and in due course the 
concerns articulated led to a research impact ‘reach and significance’ assessment element of 
20% being included in the REF 2014 research audit.  
The research impact agenda incorporated into the REF has been identified as ‘one of the 
more overt manifestations of the neoliberal corporate takeover of UK universities’ and as yet 
another sign of the concealed presence of the military sector in higher education (O’Dowd 
2014).  In preparation for REF 2014, the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) commissioned RAND to conduct an international review of how research agencies 
assessed impact and to identify ‘challenges, lessons and observations’ of relevance to the 
development of ‘a framework for assessing research impact’ in UK universities (Grant et al 
2010: ix).   
Project RAND first emerged in December 1945 in the United States and in 1946 was under 
special contract to the Douglas Aircraft Company before becoming a Federally Funded 
Research and Development Center in 1947 (Campbell 2004; Hruby et al 2011).  In 1948 
RAND evolved into a non-profit organization which, in their words, would ‘promote 
scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the 
United States of America’, but the objective of connecting military planning with research 
and development decisions has remained prominent on the organization’s agenda (RAND 
Corporation n.d (a)).  RAND has a strong and consistent track record in military research, 
with the US Air Force a longstanding contractor, and while it now conducts research across a 
spectrum that includes energy, health, education, justice, and the environment, it has a strong 
continuing commitment to international and military affairs, and has been described as 
‘[North] America’s university of imperialism’ (Chalmers 2008). 
RAND symbolizes the complexity of military-industrial interconnections. It started off as an 
organization developing new weapons systems for the military, but subsequently extended its 
reach into other fields, including university science research, politics and economics and it 
has received substantial financial support from the US Air Force and the Ford Foundation.  
 The military research and development innovations presided over by RAND personnel 
include spy satellites, the intercontinental ballistic missile system, and communications 
systems advances ‘that could survive a nuclear attack’ and which contributed significantly to 
‘the development of the internet and digital circuits’ (Chalmers 2008). The RAND 
organization has also been closely associated with key figures who have been prominent 
members of the US ‘power elite’, for example RAND corporation trustees have included 
Donald Rumsfeld (1977-2001) a Secretary of Defense in two US administrations (1975-1977 
under Gerald Ford and 2001-2006 under George W Bush) and Condoleezza Rice (Trustee 
1991-1997) National Security Advisor (2001-2005 under George W Bush) and Secretary of 
State (2005-2009 under George W Bush) and the corporation’s group of influential nuclear 
war strategists included James Schlesinger (1963-69) who went on to serve as Secretary of 
Defense (1973-75 under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) and Secretary of Energy (1977-79 
under Jimmy Carter). The individual credited with being ‘the best known of all RAND 
researchers’, the person credited with a number of nuclear war strategies, including the 
(re)location of air bases for nuclear bombers, ‘second strike capability’, ‘counter-force 
strategy’ and ‘fail-safe procedures’, was Albert Wohlstetter (RAND senior policy analyst 
1951-63, subsequently a RAND consultant) who also worked in US higher education and 
‘taught at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the University of California, 
Berkeley, in the early 1960's and at the University of Chicago from 1964 to 1980’ where he 
chaired the PhD dissertation committee of Paul Wolfowitz who went on to hold a number of 
offices of state including Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005 under George W Bush) 
(Pace 1997). 
The global reach of RAND is extensive. While the corporation is based in North America and 
Europe, its 1,700 staff members are drawn from 47 countries. The research it conducts is 
sponsored by a number of agencies, but the greatest share is accounted for by government 
bodies and includes funding through the Office of the US Secretary of Defense and other 
national security agencies, US Department of Health and Human Services and related 
agencies, the US Air Force and the US Army. In the financial year 2013, RAND received 
$263.1 million, of which 54% derived from three military-related sources of funding, namely 
Department of Defense ($63 million), US Air Force ($36.5 million) and US Army ($33.1 
million) (RAND corporation n.d. (b)).   
The contribution of RAND to developments in UK higher education, exemplified by its 
production of reports on bibliometrics and research impact for HEFCE in respect of the REF, 
as well as the marketing of two analysis and advice packages to assist universities to identify 
‘impactful research’ in their preparations for the audit through an ‘ImpactFinder 
methodology’, is presented as bringing ‘an extensive knowledge base of the university sector, 
the research funding landscape, and cutting-edge research evaluation techniques to the 
university and REF preparations’ (RAND Europe 2012). (10) In practice RAND, a neoliberal 
military-industrial complex research organization, is a significant beneficiary of the research 
impact process as it derives revenue, ‘public money’, from universities purchasing its 
services and it gains ‘unrivalled access to the publicly-funded intellectual output of every 
United Kingdom and European university that signs up with it’ (O’Dowd 2014).   
  
Concluding remarks: military, industrial, and academic complexities 
Interconnections between the military, industry, and higher education institutions are 
complex and multiple. Within the United States and Europe the influence of the military and 
commercial corporations on universities and academic research continues to attract attention 
and criticism. Concern has been expressed about both the involvement of university academic 
staff in military-related research, including work that ‘supports the maintenance and 
development of weapons of mass destruction’, and the fact that publicly resourced university 
research is contributing substantially to the ‘commercial interests of private corporations’ 
(McCoy 2014; International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility 
2012; Giroux 2007; Langley 2013: 2005; Parkinson 2012).  
The institution of the university is under siege. It has been subjected to restructuring and 
corporate forms of management and confronted with the demand that the needs of the 
economy and the business world should be accorded priority. The core values of the 
university have been compromised by marketization and a culture of consumption in which 
higher education has become increasingly enmeshed (Bailey and Freedman 2011; Readings 
1996).  With the neoliberalization of higher education, in particular the increasing emphasis 
placed upon the pursuit of external sources of research funding and need to demonstrate 
research impact, the institution of the university has been drawn ever closer to industry, the 
corporate world, and the security state, so much so that it is now situated within ‘an 
increasingly powerful military-industrial-academic complex’ (Giroux 2007: 4).  The 
neoliberal corporatized university is in the business of contributing to the generation of 
(bio)technological innovations, which reflect the growing unmanned, automated, remote-
controlled combat, command, and control requirements of the military, as well as the  labour-
saving, numerically controlled, robotic and bio-technological manufacturing and service 
sector equivalents conducive to increasing levels of capital accumulation sought by 
commercial corporations (Giroux 2014: 192-3). As it does this the institution of the university 
is simultaneously required to recognise its neoliberal responsibility to function as a market-
orientated teaching and training organization, directed to deliver enhanced employability 
prospects to its student-consumer graduates who are destined to enter occupations in a digital 
capitalist economy, where continuing developments in computerisation and artificial 
intelligence are making work and employment increasingly precarious (Beck 2000; Schiller 
2000; Frey and Osborne 2013; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).    
Signs of the changing conditions and demands to which higher education has been exposed 
led Jacques Derrida (1983: 3) to ponder on the raison d'être of the university, its ‘meaning 
and mission ... [and] destination’.  A major debate has been in process for some time now on 
‘the subject of research and teaching, and on the role the university may play in this arena’ 
(Derrida 1983: 11).  In particular consideration has been focussed on the ‘“orientation” of 
research’, specifically the utilitarian matter of the application or impact of research, and this 
has become a concern in ‘all the highly industrialized countries’, and is now ‘centered ... on 
multi-national military-industrial complexes or techno-economic networks, or rather 
 international technomilitary networks that are apparently multi- or trans-national in form’ 
(Derrida 1983: 11).   
With increasing frequency the direction of research is being influenced and shaped, if not 
determined, by factors extraneous to the field of knowledge and beyond the institution of the 
university. In UK universities, what is researched and how research is conducted are matters 
increasingly influenced, if not governed, by a fiscally driven, thematic shaping of research 
designed to fit funding agendas set by research councils, meet the interests of industry, 
corporations, the security state and military, and provide appropriate impact narratives to 
satisfy external research audits. In short, increasingly research is ‘organized in an 
authoritarian fashion in view of its utilization’ (Derrida 1983: 11). 
A distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘end-oriented’ research is now difficult to maintain and, 
while this is not new, ‘never before has so-called basic scientific research been so deeply 
committed to aims that are at the same time military aims’ (Derrida 1983: 12).  The growing 
militarization of academic research across disciplinary fields, from the natural sciences to the 
social sciences, undermines not only the institution of the university and academic freedom, 
but also the prospect of enhancing understanding between people and contributing to the 
achievement of a ‘peaceful, sustainable and just world’ (International Network of Engineers 
and Scientists for Global Responsibility 2011).  Research in universities needs to be 
challenging and countering the military-industrial complex, rather than colluding with it to 
promote military and corporate interests. 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) US government economic policies that devote significant fiscal resources to the institution of the 
military – for example, to fund wars and associated missions – maintain bases and personnel, promote 
procurement, as well as to underwrite scientific and technological research and development, have served not 
only to enhance defensive and offensive capacity, but also to stimulate economic growth. What has become 
known as ‘military Keynesianism’ has been a persistent feature of successive US administrations, both 
Democrat and Republican (Custers 2010). 
 
(2) The term military-industrial complex is employed by Winfield Riefler (1947) in reference to the 
specific nation states engaged in conflict in the Second World War, especially the United States,  and the 
resources required to function effectively:  ‘assortment of factories, industrial manpower and technical skills ... 
access to the foodstuffs necessary to sustain its civilian population and its armed forces, and … the various raw 
materials required for a minimum level of civilian consumption and a maximum output of munitions of war’.  
(3)       Chomsky (2004) makes reference to Republicans during Ronald Regan’s Presidency pumping federal  
funds into the economy to ‘reindustrialize America’, IBM utilizing public funds, and government sponsored 
research contributing significantly to the emergence of bio-tech companies and adds:  
 So Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex is not quite what is generally interpreted. In part, yes, it’s 
military. But a main function of the military, or the National Institutes of Health, or the rest of the 
federal system, is to provide some device to socialize costs, get the public to pay the costs, to take the 
risks. Ultimately, if anything comes out, you put it into private pockets. And, again, this has to be done 
in a way that protects state power and private power from the domestic enemy. You have to say it’s to 
defend ourselves against Grenada or Russia or Guatemala or somebody. If you get people frightened 
enough, they won’t notice that their taxes are going into creating the profits of IBM and Merck twenty 
years from now. Why not tell them the truth? Because then they might not make these decisions. 
(4)            On February 22nd 1993, DARPA was once again designated ARPA and on February 10th 1996, 
‘Public Law 104-106, under Title IX of the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act, directed the name be 
changed back to DARPA’ (ARPA-DARPA: The Name Chronicles.  http://www.darpa.mil/about/history/arpa-
darpa__the_name_chronicles.aspx  accessed 31/3/15) 
(5)             The societal impact of military research in universities also remains a contentious matter, an issue 
that raises questions not only about the funding of university research and the influence that may be exerted by 
the particular priorities associated with military interests, but also broader concerns about the impact of 
university research per se (Wilson 1989; Kistiakowsky 1989; Ahmed 2014; Department of Defense 2014a: 
2014b).    
(6)                The formative technological roots of an increasingly digitalized informational machine-centric 
capitalism can be traced back to the Second World War and military sponsorship of research in the fields of 
communication and control of information, specifically in electronics, servomechanisms, and computers (Noble 
1983: 1984). As Joseph Weizenbaum observed in the late 1970s,  
[t]he computer in its modern form was born from the womb of the military. As with so much other 
modern technology of the same parentage, almost every technological advance in the computer field, 
including those motivated by the demands of the military, has had its residual payoff-fallout – in the 
civilian sector (1979: 455).  
(7)             The Minerva Initiative resembles, in some respects at least, an earlier, ill-fated, and controversial 
social science research initiative, Project Camelot, which emerged in 1963 from the US Army’s Office of 
Research and Development and involved American University’s Special Operations Research Office (SORO), 
which had been established with Army funding to conduct ‘social science research for the Army’ on potential 
circumstances in which troops might be deployed in particular regions of US interest (Nisbet 1966: 45).  The 
specific objective of Project Camelot was to conduct research on ‘conditions of social unrest, riots and 
insurrection’ (Nisbet 1966: 46), to identify the symptoms of societal breakdown and measures that might be 
taken to counter and/or deal with social breakdown.  The designated geopolitical areas of interest for the 
research were ‘Latin America, the Middle East, the Far East, Western Europe and Africa’ (Nisbet 1966: 45-6). 
However, the project was terminated from Washington by Presidential directive when news of it emerged in 
Chile and fears were aroused about the impact of ‘Government sponsored foreign area research’ on international 
relations (Nisbet 1966: 49: 1971; Horowitz 1967). 
(8)       From 2007, an experimental Pentagon program, the Human Terrain System, embedded anthropologists 
and other social scientists in American combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq. In September that year, ‘Defense 
Secretary Robert M. Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program ... [to] assign teams of 
anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan’ 
(Rohde 2007).  
 (9)          UK universities receiving funding from AWE, including the strategic partner universities (Langley 
2013: 17).
 
(10)     In 2012 RAND Europe conducted a small scale pilot study of universities in Australia to assess 
research impact.  See  Morgan Jones M, Castel-Clarke S, Manville C, Gunashekar S, and Grant J Assessing 
Research Impact: An International Review of the Excellence in Innovation for Australia Trial 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR278/RAND_RR278.pdf  25/2/15. 
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